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NATURE OF THE CASE 
Civil No. 15106 
This action, initiated by the Plaintiff-Respondent 
in the Court below, sought a Permanent Injunction (Permanent 
Restraining Order) which would prevent the Defendant-Appellant 
from entering the premises known as Temple Square located in 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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II 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Court below after trial granted Plaintiff-
Respondent' s request for a Permanent Restraining Order. 
Said Order enjoined Defendant-Appellant from entering upon 
Temple Square, Salt Lake City, Utah in such a manner as to 
interfere with, impair or abridge the religious services or 
conferences of others. 
III 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment 
and an order of dismissal. 
IV 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was filed in the District Court of the 
Third Judicial District in and for the County of Salt Lake 
by the Plaintiff-Respondent seeking a Temporary Restraining 
Order and a Permanent Injunction against the Defendant-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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Appellant. Two Temporary Restraining Orders were issued by 
the Court, against the Defendant-Appellant. The Defendant-
Appellant filed an Answer to the Complaint and a Counterclaim 
alleging that the initial Temporary Restraining Order was 
wrongfully obtained and caused harm to the Defendant-Appellant. 
The Court below dismissed the Defendant-Appellant's Counterclaim 
for failure to state a cause of action. Said dismissal was 
affirmed on appeal. The Complaint was brought before the 
Court for trial and was heard by the Court August 15, 1977. 
The Court below granted the Plaintiff-Respondent's request 
for a Permanent Restraining Order against Defendant-Appellant 
and said Order was issued August 23, 1977. 
The Defendant-Appellant filed a timely notice of 
appeal on the issuance of the Permanent Restraining Order. 
v 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 6, 1976, Defendant-Appellant entered the 
premises known as the Tabernacle on Temple Square in Salt 
Lake City, Utah during the semi-annual conference of an 
unincorporated association known as The Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, hereinafter, the Church. The 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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10 
Defendant-Appellant attempted to approach the speaker's 
stand at said conference when he was stopped by several 
ushers and removed from the building. 
In September, 1976 the Plaintiff-Respondent petitioned 
the lower Court for a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining 
the Defendant-Appellant from entering the above mentioned 
Tabernacle during a conference of the Church to be held in 
Octobe~ ,1976. The Plaintiff-Respondent also petitioned the 
lower Court for a Permanent Injunction prohibiting Defendant-
Appellant from ever entering the above mentioned Temple 
Square. Plaintiff-Respondent alleged that Defendant-Appellant's 
conduct of April 6, 1976 and certain letters of Defendant-
Appellant indicated Defendant-Appellant was a threat to the 
peaceful assembly of worshippers on Temple Square. 
The lower Court issued a Temporary Restraining 
Order enjoining Defendant-Appellant from entering the Tabernacle 
during the October, 1976 conference of the Church. Defendant-
Appellant was at all times obedient to that Order. 
During March of 1977 and directly prior to another 
scheduled conference of the Church, the matter of the 
Permanent Injunction was still pending. The Plaintiff-
Respondent requested another Temporary Restraining Order 
enjoining Defendant-Appellant from entering Temple Square 
during the April, 1977 conference of the Church. Such an 
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Order was issued exparte by the lower Court. Defendant-
Appellant was at all times obedient to said Order. 
The issue of the Permanent Restraining Order or 
Permament Injunction came for trial in the lower Court 
August 15, 1977 before the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., 
District Judge. The lower Court granted Plaintiff-Respondent's 
petition and issued a Permanent Restraining Order. Said 
Order reads in part as follows: 
. . . that the Defendant be and he is hereby 
permanently enjoined from entering upon Temple 
Square, Salt Lake City, Utah, during such times 
and under such circumstances as to interfere 
with, impair or abridge by his conduct, the 
religious services or conferences of other 
persons or the free exercise of religion by 
such other persons therein or thereon; provided 
however, that this injunction is neither 
intended nor is it to be construed to interfere 
with or abridge Defendant's right to free speech 
and expression, or Defendant's right to the 
free exercise of his religious beliefs at such 
other times and places, or under such other 
circumstances as to not interfere with the 
constitutionally protected rights to the free 
exercise of religion of and by other per-
sons, ... 
VI 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE 
CORPORATE PLAINTIFF IN THE ACTION AT ISSUE HAD STANDING AND 
WAS A PROPER PARTY IN INTEREST. 
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It has long been a basic underlying principle of 
Anglo-American law that a civil action may be prosecuted 
only by a party having a real interest in the determination 
of the suit. This concept is embodied by lltah Statute in 
Rule 17(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This rule 
states in part, "Every action shall be prosecuted in the 
name of the real party in interest." 
The purpose for this requirement of interest on 
the part of civil plaintiffs has been clarified by the Utah 
Supreme Court: 
The reason the defendant has the right to a 
cause of action prosecuted by the real party 
in interest is so that the judgment will preclude 
any action on the same demand by another and 
permit the defendant to assert all defenses or 
counterclaims available against the real owner 
of the cause. Shaw v. Jepnson, 121 Utah 155, 
239 P. 2d 745 (1952). 
In the instant case, action was brought not by the 
true parties in interest but by the Plaintiff, a corporate 
sole known as the Corporation of the President of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. This corporate entity 
exists solely for the purpose of handling the financial and 
property affairs of the unincorporated association known as 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. According 
to testimony adduced at trial, the purpose of the Plaintiff 
is to deal with the Church's estate. The purpose of the 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Plaintiff is not to worship. However, the Plaintiff alleged 
in its petitions for a Permanent Restraining Order against 
the Defendant that the injury Defendant would cause if not 
enjoined was an injury to the rights of certain parties to 
freely assemble and practice their religion. The Plaintiff 
has alleged that Defennant's conduct of April 6, 1976 and 
certain letters written by Defendant and entered in evidence 
by Plaintiff indicate the Defendant will, if not enjoined, 
disrupt the worship services held by the Church and known as 
general conferences. The Plaintiff has alleged these con-
ferences are attended by thousands of members of the Church 
and are broadcast world wide to other Church members. 
Hence, the Plaintiff has revealed the true parties in interest 
in the present action. The true parties in interest are the 
Church itself and the individual worshippers, members of the 
Church. Since the Plaintiff does not deal with ecclesiastical 
affairs of the Church it cannot have any legal interest in 
the worship services of the Church. Moreover, since the 
Plaintiff corporate sole consists of only one person, it 
cannot be found that the Plaintiff is in any way representative 
of all parties in interest in the present case. 
In addition, the Plaintiff is not the proper party 
in interest to bring even an action concerning the trespass 
issues which may be involved in the instant case. The 
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general rule of law is that a party in ~ossession of real 
property has the exclusive right of action for injuries 
affecting the possession. Bowe v. Palmer, 36 rtah 214, 102 
P. 1007 (1909); 49 Am Jur. 2d L/~ §281 (1964). A landlord/ 
owner's right of action is linited to protection of his 
reversionary interest. ~iller v. Ediso~ Electric Illu:ninating 
Co. of New York, 184 NY 17, 76 ~ 734 (1906); Am Jur. 2d 
L/T §86 (1964). 
In the instant case, Temple Square is owned by the 
Plaintiff, a corporate sole. The Plaintiff does not personally 
occupy Temple Square, but "leases" the premises to the unin-
corporated association, the Church. The Church is in exclu-
sive possession of Temple Square. Under law, the C~urch and 
not the Plaintiff has exclusive right of action for trespass 
to Temple Square, both action for damages caused by trespass 
and for injunctive relief to prevent future trespasses. 
Hence the proper party of interest to institute the present 
action, even as it may pertain to property interests in 
Temple Square, is not the Plaintiff but the Church. 
Thus, the lower Court's decision should be re-
versed for four reasons: 1) T~e decision violates ~tah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 17(a) by granting the Plaintiff 
standing to bring their action. The decision also denies 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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the Defendant the rights established in Jeppson, supra, in 
t~at; 2) other actions on the same demand may be brought by 
ether parties at a later time, and 3) the Defendant is 
denied the opportunity of asserting the defenses and counterclaim 
he may have against the true parties in interest, the Church 
and its members; 4) the Plaintiff is not the proper party 
in interest to bring any action regarding trespass to Temple 
Square since the Plaintiff is an owner/landlord who is not 
in possession of Temple Sauare and was not in possession of 
Temple Square at any time during which the alleged injurious 
conduct of Defendant occurred. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A PE~~NT RESTRAINING 
ORDER IN THAT THERE WERE ADEQUATE REMEDIES AT LAW TO PROTECT 
THE PLAINTIFF FROM THE ALLEGED HAR."i TO BE CAUSED BY DEFENDANT. 
A permanent restraining order or permanent injunc-
tion is an extraordinary writ which the courts issue only 
when all legal remedies are inadequate to afford the Plain-
tiff relief. 
Generally, equity will protect personal 
rights by injunction upon the same ~onditions 
on which it will protect property rights •.. 
that is, where a substantial right of Plaintiff 
will be injured in a material degree unless 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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relief is granted, (and) the remedy at law 
is inadequate, . . . 43A C. J. S. Inj un. § 140, (1948) (emphasis added) 
In the instant case, Plaintiff has sufficient 
remedies at law to guard against any alleged potential harm 
by the Defendant such that issuance of the Permanent Restraining 
Order by the lower Court was error. 
The Plaintiff has alleged that, if not enjoined, 
Defendant will enter Temple Square during the Church's semi-
annual conference worship services and will disrupt said 
conferences. The Plaintiff has two legal remedies for such 
alleged harm. First, the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
City, Utah afford Plaintiff a legal remedy. Section 32-1-13 
of said Ordinances states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person to 
disturb a public assembly, congregated for 
religious or other lawful purposes, within 
the limits of Salt Lake City, by undue noise, 
or by offensive, unbecoming or indecent 
behavior. 
Second, the Plaintiff has a remedy at law for any 
alleged potential harm of the Defendant through an action 
for trespass. Section 32-3-3(1) of the Revised Ordinances 
of Salt Lake City, Utah states in part: 
It shall be unlawful for any person to .. · 
ride, drive, walk, lodge, or camp or sleep 
upon the premises of another without the per-
mission of the owner or occupant thereof. 
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The Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides in 76-6-
(1) ~or pu1:poses of this section "enter" means 
intrusion of the entire body. 
(2) A person is guilty of criminal trespass 
if •... 
(a) He enters or remains unlawfully on 
property and: 
~i~ Intends to cause annoyance or 
inJury to any person thereon or 
damage to any property thereon; 
(b) Knowing his entry or presence is 
unlawful, he enters or remains on property 
as to which notice against entering is 
given by: 
(i) Personal communication to the 
actor by the owner or someone with 
apparent authority to act for the 
owner; or 
(ii) Fencing or other enclosure obviously 
designed to exclude intruders; or 
(iii) Posting of signs reasonably 
likely to come to the attention of 
intruders. 
According to the findings of the lower Court Plaintiff is 
the lawful owner of Temple Square. Hence, the Plaintiff has 
a legal remedy for trespass any time the Defendant should 
enter Temple Square without the permission of Plaintiff. 
POINT III 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT ADOPTED BY THE COURT BELOW DO 
NOT SUPPORT THE ORDER OF THE LOWER COURT AND ARE INADEQUATE 
AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
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If the Court is to enjoin the Defendant from the 
future acts disruptive of worship services on Temple Square 
the lower Court must make a finding of fact that the Defendant 
will in the future disrupt worship services on Temple Square. 
Anderson v. Jensen, 71 U. 295,296 P. 745, (1948). At the 
very least the Court should be required to find a reasonable 
possibility that the Defendant will disrupt future worship 
services. It is not logical for a Court to enjoin the 
Defendant from committing certain acts if there is little or 
no possibility of the acts ever occuring. 
The lower Court has made no findings of fact that 
the Defendant will or even possibly will disrupt future 
worship services on Temple Square. The Court has found 
merely that the Defendant entered Temple Square on April 6, 
1976 in an attempt to disrupt the general conference of the 
Church and that the Defendant has made various threats 
concerning ecclesiastical trials of certain leaders of the 
Church. The lower Court has made no finding of fact that 
the Defendant will or has any intention to make good these 
threats. Hence, the Court erred in issuing the Permanent 
Restraining Order in that there were insufficient findings 
of fact to support issuance of the Order. 
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POINT IV 
THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE LOWER COURT ARE NOT 
SUPPORTED BY THE TESTIMONY ADDUCED AT TRIAL. 
The Court below in its Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law made the following findings in paragraph 6 
concerning the events of April 6, 1976: 
. . . that the Defendant and his two associates 
were blocked from proceeding through one avenue 
to the podium and commenced across the front 
aisle of the Tabernacle; that Defendant pushed 
an usher aside who stood in his way requesting 
if he could be of help; the Defendant stated 
in substance, "Don't try to stop the Lord;" 
that thereafter two security personnel took 
hold of Defendant and turned him around, the 
Defendant stating in substance, "Don't touch me, 
I'm the Lord;" that the Defendant was escorted 
from the Tabernacle by said security personnel, ... 
These findings are in direct conflict with testimony 
produced at trial. On page 176 of the trial record the 
Defendant's testimony is as follows: 
Q. With respect to your entrance into the 
Tabernacle, you were intent on getting to the 
podium I take it, from the fact that you 
struck 1 aside an usher; is that correct? 
A. I did not strike aside an usher. 
Q. You heard the testimony of Mr. Truitt? 
A. I take exception to the testimony. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Q. All right. Is it your testimony now under 
oath that you did not brush him aside and cause 
him to stumble? 
A. Mr. Truitt's hand came out at me and I 
pushed it aside as being an effort t~ restrain 
me. 
Q. And what did you say to Mr. Truitt? 
A. I think my words were, "Get out of my 
way." 
Q. You heard his testimony that you said, 
"Don't stop me. I'm the lord"? 
A. This is what he said. 
Q. That was not your testimony? 
A. That was not my statement. 
It is inappropriate for a Court to make a findi 
of fact where there is directly conflicting testimony and 
---------- ----------------the lower Court erred in making the findings included in 
paragraph 6 of the Findings of Fact. 
In addition, the Court erred in failing to find as 
fact that the Defendant corresponded with the President of 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints for the 
purpose of discussing his exconununication from said church 
~~-~~------- ~1 
and an ecclesiastical trial to be held ~f le~ders of said I 
I , 
church for alleged misconduct and that the Defendant believe1]',~ 
the doctrines of said church gave him a right to initiate i , 
! ~ 
such a trial. Uncontradicted testimony and other evidence ! ~ 
I~ 
•\ 
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was produced at trial to support such findings of fact. It 
was error for the lower Court to omit such uncontradicted 
information from its findings of fact. 
POINT V 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN TAKING JURISDICTION OF A 
PURELY RELIGIOUS DISPUTE AND ALLOWED THE PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
BY AND THROUGH THE CIVIL COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH TO 
SUPPRESS THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOMS AND RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES OF 
THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 
All of the events, alleged injuries and alleged 
potential injuries surrounding the litigation which has led 
to the issuance of the Permanent Restraining Order involve 
an ecclesiastical dispute between the Plaintifr and the 
Defendant. The Defendant claims a religious belief that the 
doctrine of his church allows him to bring certain leaders 
of the church to church trial for alleged malfeasance in 
office. The Plaintiff claims on the other hand that the 
Defendant's efforts to exercise this doctrinal belief constitute 
an infringement of Plaintiff's rights to exercise his religion. 
The dispute is, in short, an intra-church dispute over 
authority within the Church. 
The lower Court erred by taking cognizance of this 
intra-church dispute at all. The Courts are estopped by 
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constitutional fiat and unanimous court precedents from 
determining any and all matters of church discipline, faith, 
rule, custom or law. The landmark United States Supreme 
Court case of Watson v. Jones, established this rule. The 
Watson court stated: 
The right to organize voluntary religious 
associates to assist in the expression and dis-
semination of any religious doctrine, and to 
create tribunals for the decision of controverted 
questions of faith within the association, 
and for the ecclesiastical government of all 
the individual members, congregations, and 
officers within the general association, is 
unquestioned. All who unite themselves to 
uch a body do s ~~ to 
t is go , and are oun o su mi to 
it. Bilt it would be-avainConsent and woutd 
lead to 'flre:-rotal sub~ religi6Us 
bbdit::~ an~~:~mgneved by one of their 
decisions co_ll!<:!_a~ to _th~ secular courts 
ana ~em reversed. It is of the essence 
oft~~~-'--~ 
tb---esta1rlrstrirt1rur1a ls for the dec-i s ion of 
q~--ar±-s-i-n~ramongthemse-lves;--- that 
thOS'e decisions should be_bj.Yfcring :[n all 
c~ses of eeclesiasticalcogg__i~Clnce, subject 
o!\:lY to such appeals as __!!i.~<!_r:lism irsetf 
~rOVl.des ror. N"Qi_@__N.~ that JUSflce -
w~ to ~ornotea -~ul:rnri-rti?!g 
t se ec sions to re · n he~ j-1.ldicrar-tr una s. Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall 
67~ Ed. 666 E-l-872). 
Other authorities supporting the view that civil 
courts will not review acts of church discipline or member 
expulsion include 66 Am. Jur. 2d p. 781-787; 70 ALR 71-90; 
and 20 ALR 2d 421-522. A recent case supporting this view 
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is Simpson v. Wells Lamont Corporation, 484 F. 2d 490 (1974). 
There is no way that a Court can rule on the 
instant case without making a decision concerning church 
doctrine. If the lower Court is sustained the Courts will 
have decided that under church doctrine the Defendant does 
not have the right to present grievances to the general 
conference of his church regarding malfeasance of the church's 
leaders. If the Court rules in favor of the Defendant, the 
Court will have determined that the Defendant does have such 
a right. Since the Court cannot rule for either party 
without making a secular decision of religious doctrine, the 
lower Court erred in taking cognizance of the case at all 
and the lower Court should be reversed and the case dismissed. 
POINT VI 
THE ORDER ISSUED BY THE COURT BELOW IS SO VAGUE AS 
TO VIOLATE THE TERMS OF RULE 65 A(d) OF THE UTAH RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE. 
part: 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65 A(d) states in 
Every ~rder granting an injunct~on and every 
restraining order shall be specif7c in terms; 
shall describe in reasonable detail, and not 
by reference to the complaint or other do~u­
ment, the act or acts sought to be restrained; ... 
'JI 
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The Permanent Restraining Order granted the Plain-
tiff by the lower Court violates Rule 65 A(d) in its failure 
to describe in reasonable detail the act or acts sought to 
be restrained. The Defendant is prohibited from entering 
Temple Square in such a manner as to "interfere with, impair 
or abridge by his conduct, the religious services or conferences 
of other persons .... " The Court does not, however, 
clarify just what conduct it deems to interfere with, impair 
or abridge religious services. The Order continues on to 
provide that the Order is not to be construed to interfere 
with or abridge Defendant's rights to free speech, religion 
and assembly. The Court does not clarify how the Order is 
to be construed when the religious convictions of the Defendant 
conflict with those of other worshippers on Temple Square. 
The Order does not even clarify whether or not the past 
conduct of Defendant which precipitated the present action 
would, if repeated, constitute a violation of the Order. 
The Permanent Restraining Order is so vague as to 
be useless. It affords neither the Plaintiff, the Defendant 
nor future tribunals any concrete information as to what 
constitutes a violation of the Order. For this reason the 
lower Court should be reversed. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Court below erred in issuing the Permanent 
Restraining Order. The Court erred in allowing the Plain-
tiff to have standing to bring action. The Court erred in 
granting the Order when the Plaintiff had adequate remedies 
at law to protect it from the alleged harm. The Court erred 
in making its findings of fact and in holding that these 
findings of fact supported the Order. The Court erred in 
taking jurisdiction of a religious dispute and in issuing an 
order so vague in its terms as to violate Rule 65 A(d) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The lower Court decision 
should be reversed and the matter dismissed. 
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